Business & EconomicsScience & Nature
The theory of learning in games
- Pages
- 285
- 3 editions
- First published
- 1998
- 1 language
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Overview
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements.
In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
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Editions
Details & links
- First published
- 1998
- Pages
- 285
- Languages
- Available in 1 language
Where to buy this book: see “Buy this book”
More about this book
Read a sample, borrow it or see other editions → openlibrary.org