Cover of Two-Sided Matching

Two-Sided Matching

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Pages
279
3 editions
First published
1992
1 language

Overview

Winner of the Operations Research Society of America Lanchester Award, Two-Sided Matching provides a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching such as between firms and workers in labor markets, and between buyers and sellers in auctions. The book begins with a discussion of empirical results concerning behavior in such markets, and then proceeds to analyze a variety of related models. Among the discrete and continuous models considered are those with complete or incomplete information, money or barter, single or multiple workers, and simple or complex preferences. The book examines the stability of outcomes, the modification of incentives to agents under different organizational rules, and the constraints imposed on market organization by the incentives. Using this wide range of related models and matching situations helps clarify which conclusions are robust and which depend on particular modeling assumptions.
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Editions

  • Format not known Cambridge University Press 2013 English ISBN 9781139052214 Open Library
  • Paperback Cambridge University Press 2003 English ISBN 9780521437882 Open Library
  • Paperback Cambridge University Press 1992 279 pages English ISBN 9780521437882 Open Library

Details & links

First published
1992
Pages
279
Languages
Available in 1 language

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