Cover of Cartesian psychology and physical minds

Cartesian psychology and physical minds

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Pages
273
1 edition
First published
1995
1 language

Overview

This book offers an extensive critique of individualism in psychology, a view that has been the subject of debate between philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Tyler Burge for many years. Rob Wilson approaches individualism as an issue in the philosophy of science, and by discussing issues such as computationalism and the mind's modularity, he opens the subject up for non-philosophers in psychology and computer science.

Professor Wilson carefully examines the most influential arguments for individualism and identifies the main metaphysical assumptions underlying them. Because the topic is so central to the philosophy of mind, an area generating enormous research and debate at present, the book has implications for a very broad range of philosophical issues, including the naturalization of intentionality, psychophysical supervenience, the nature of mental causation, and the viability of folk psychology.

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Editions

  • Format not known Cambridge University Press 1995 273 pages English ISBN 9780521474023 Open Library

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First published
1995
Pages
273
Languages
Available in 1 language

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